Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the Taliban by Pitt, Celidon
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 83 Volume 83 
Issue 5 Volume 83, Issue 5 Article 22 
2015 
Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. 
Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the 
Taliban 
Celidon Pitt 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law 
Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Celidon Pitt, Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers and the Recent 
Prisoner Exchange with the Taliban, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2837 (2015). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol83/iss5/22 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2837 
FAIR TRADE:  
THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO RECOVER 
CAPTURED U.S. SERVICEMEMBERS AND 
THE RECENT PRISONER EXCHANGE 
WITH THE TALIBAN 
Celidon Pitt* 
 
The Obama Administration’s controversial exchange of five Taliban 
detainees for a captured U.S. soldier in May 2014 reignited a heated debate 
over the proper scope of wartime executive authority.  From a legal 
perspective, the primary issue centers on the constitutional balance of 
power between congressional appropriations and the President’s power as 
Commander in Chief.  A complete analysis incorporates both judicial and 
historical precedent to evaluate the conflict within the broader context of 
prisoner recovery efforts. 
This Note argues that, regardless of the validity of legislative restrictions 
on the transfer of Guantánamo detainees, the President possessed sufficient 
authority to conduct the prisoner exchange.  Commanders in Chief have 
retained exclusive control over recovery efforts since the Revolutionary 
War, often exchanging nontraditional detainees for regular servicemembers 
without any congressional opposition.  Furthermore, as this Note 
concludes, Congress elsewhere granted the President ample discretion over 
notification and defense spending to legally conduct the exchange. 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2839 
I.   THE SWORD AND THE PURSE:  THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS ............................. 2842 
A.   Textual and Historical Origins of the Tension Between 
Congress’s Defense Spending Power and the President’s 
Authority As Commander in Chief ........................................ 2843 
1.   Congress’s Defense Spending Power ............................. 2843 
2.   The President’s Authority As Commander in Chief ....... 2845 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2006, U.S. Naval 
Academy.  Captain, U.S. Marine Corps.  The views expressed in this Note are those of the 
author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, U.S. 
government, or U.S. Marine Corps.  Many thanks to my advisor, Professor Thomas Lee, and 
my wife, Dr. Wynne Kandur. 
2838 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
B.   Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Scope of Executive 
Authority ............................................................................... 2846 
1.   United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.:  What 
Are the Limits of Presidential Discretion over Foreign 
Affairs? ............................................................................ 2847 
2.   Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:  When May 
the President Act in Contravention of Congressional 
Will? ................................................................................ 2848 
3.   Dames & Moore v. Regan:  Is Congressional Silence 
Tantamount to Acquiescence? ........................................ 2851 
C.   Practical Precedents Illustrating the Balance Between 
Legislative and Executive War Powers ................................. 2852 
1.   Appropriations Riders As a Means of Congressional 
Oversight:  The Boland Amendments and the Iran-
Contra Affair ................................................................... 2853 
2.   Consultation and Notification Requirements .................. 2854 
a.   The War Powers Resolution ...................................... 2855 
b.   Intelligence Oversight ............................................... 2856 
3.   Presidential Control of Wartime Prisoner Detention and 
Recovery Policy .............................................................. 2857 
a.   The Revolutionary War ............................................. 2858 
b.   The Civil War ............................................................ 2859 
c.   World War II ............................................................. 2859 
d.   The Vietnam War ...................................................... 2860 
e.   The Global War on Terror Before 2009 .................... 2862 
II.   DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO 
EXCHANGE TALIBAN DETAINEES FOR AN AMERICAN PRISONER 
OF WAR DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE 
TRANSFER OR RELEASE OF GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES? ............ 2863 
A.   Congressional Attempts to Control Detainee Policy 
Through Its Power of the Purse ............................................ 2863 
1.   The Increasingly Contentious Legislative Environment 
Surrounding Guantánamo Detainees:  2009–2013 .......... 2864 
a.   The 2010 and 2011 NDAAs ....................................... 2865 
b.   The 2012 NDAA ........................................................ 2867 
c.   The 2013 NDAA ........................................................ 2869 
2.   The 2014 NDAA:  Congressional Limitations on 
Guantánamo Transfers and the Obama Administration’s 
Response ......................................................................... 2870 
B.   The Exchange of Five Taliban Detainees for a Captured 
U.S. Soldier in May 2014 ...................................................... 2874 
C.   The Controversy Surrounding the President’s Ability to 
Conduct the Exchange .......................................................... 2875 
1.   Congress Objects to Not Being Properly Notified and 
the GAO Declares the Exchange Illegal ......................... 2876 
2015] PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PRISONER EXCHANGES 2839 
2.   The Obama Administration Argues That the Exchange 
Was a Valid Exercise of the President’s Power As 
Commander in Chief ....................................................... 2876 
III.   THE PRESIDENT POSSESSED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
TO EXCHANGE TALIBAN DETAINEES FOR A CAPTURED U.S. 
SOLDIER DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON 
GUANTÁNAMO TRANSFERS .......................................................... 2878 
A.   The Exchange Complied with Judicial Precedent ................. 2878 
1.   Operating Within Youngstown’s Zone of Twilight ......... 2879 
2.   Dames & Moore’s Deference to Intent ........................... 2880 
3.   Executive Discretion Under Curtiss-Wright ................... 2880 
B.   The Exchange Complied with Historical Precedent .............. 2881 
1.   U.S. Prisoner Recovery Policy Always Has Permitted 
Exchanging Captured Combatants with the Enemy ........ 2881 
2.  Notification Requirements and Spending Restrictions 
Had Never Before Impeded the Recovery of a Captured 
U.S. Servicemember ....................................................... 2883 
3.   Appropriations Riders Are a Means of Shaping Policy, 
Not Dictating Tactical Decisions .................................... 2884 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2885 
 
Congress are not a fit Body to act as a Council of war.  They are too large, 
too slow and their Resolutions can never be kept secret.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Afghan valley consists mostly of scrub grass and boulders.2  U.S. 
Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl seems disoriented as he sits in the back of a 
pickup truck, repeatedly blinking his eyes as if seeing daylight for the first 
time in a while.3  He makes small talk with a couple of men in traditional 
dress, their faces covered and their hands gripping automatic rifles.4  The 
churn of rotor blades from an approaching helicopter focuses Bergdahl’s 
attention.5  A white scrap of fabric attached to a crooked piece of wood 
snaps in the downwash as a dust cloud envelops the landing zone, causing 
Bergdahl to blink even more.6 
A handful of men stride out of the helicopter and toward the truck.7  
They are wearing Western clothing and also cover their faces.8  The 
 
 1. Letter from Samuel Chase to Richard Henry Lee (May 17, 1776), in 4 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789:  MAY 16, 1776–AUGUST 15, 1776, at 22 (Paul Smith 
ed., 1979). 
 2. This description is based on the open source video of the American recovery of 
Bergdahl. See Mark Thompson, Watch the Bowe Bergdahl Video, TIME (June 4, 2014), 
http://time.com/2822102/heres-what-that-bergdahl-video-really-shows/. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
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exchange is quick and informal, each side offering small head nods before 
going their separate ways.9  The Westerners accompany Bergdahl to the 
helicopter, stopping him a few feet short to quickly pat him down for 
hidden weapons or explosives.10  He does not seem to mind.11  Moments 
later, the helicopter picks up and noses over, hugging the terrain on its way 
out of the zone and taking the first step in Bergdahl’s long journey back to 
American soil.12  The rest of the men jump in the pickup truck and drive 
off, presumably to continue their efforts in support of the insurgency that 
has plagued Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion in 2001.13 
The scene in that valley, only a few minutes long, was the culmination of 
years of negotiation between the U.S. government and the Taliban, which 
had held Bergdahl captive since mid-2009.14  In exchange for Bergdahl’s 
freedom, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed to transfer five Taliban 
detainees from the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center to Qatari custody.15  
It also sent nearly one million dollars to Qatar as encouragement for the 
country to accept the detainees and host them over the next year.16  The 
return of the final American prisoner of war (POW) in Operation Enduring 
Freedom—and indeed the broader “War on Terror”—was cause for 
celebration17 and a necessary precursor to the abatement of the United 
States’ involvement in Afghanistan.18  According to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), however, the exchange was also illegal.19 
The GAO’s argument for illegality focused on two statutes.  First, section 
8111 of the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act20 (CAA) prohibited the 
Pentagon from “using appropriated funds to transfer any individuals 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, American Soldier Freed by Taliban in Prisoner 
Trade, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at A1. 
 15. See id. 
 16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO B-326013, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 3 (2014) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT]. 
 17. See Matt Furber, Planned Celebration for a Soldier Just Got a Whole Lot Bigger, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2014, at A7. 
 18. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Matthew Rosenberg, Parents of P.O.W. Reveal U.S. Talks 
on Taliban Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1 (describing peace talks as “moribund” in 
the absence of a prisoner exchange agreement); Jack Goldsmith, Two Legal Takeaways from 
Yesterday’s HASC Hearing, LAWFARE (June 12, 2014, 9:19 AM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/two-legal-takeaways-from-yesterdays-hasc-hearing/ 
(“[A] declaration of the end of the conflict—with the Taliban, al Qaeda, or both—would 
trigger legal pressure and eventually a legal duty to release all Taliban and/or al Qaeda 
detainees not subject to trial, including ones the President has deemed too dangerous to 
release.”).  Overall, the status of the Guantánamo detainees after U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan is unclear. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, How Wartime Detention Ends, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 625, 625–28 (2014); Stephen I. Vladeck, Detention After the AUMF, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2189, 2193–96 (2014). 
 19. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, tit. VIII, § 8111, 128 Stat. 5. 
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detained at Guantanamo Bay unless the Secretary of Defense notifies 
certain congressional committees at least 30 days before the transfer.”21  
Citing the time-sensitive nature of the negotiations, as well as the 
questionable status of Bergdahl’s health, however, the Pentagon did not 
notify Congress of the transfer until after it had been completed.22  Second, 
the GAO concluded that DOD’s use of appropriated funds for an 
unauthorized purpose—specifically the “reprogramming” of one million 
dollars from the Army’s wartime operations and maintenance budget to pay 
Qatar—violated the Antideficiency Act23 (ADA), which “prohibits federal 
agencies from incurring obligations exceeding an amount available in an 
appropriation.”24  DOD, in other words, could not afford to pay the Qataris 
because it did not request money from Congress to do so.25  The GAO 
limited its analysis to DOD’s noncompliance with the notification 
requirements and spending limitations, avoiding the issue of the statutes’ 
underlying constitutionality.26  DOD immediately challenged this analysis, 
arguing that the spending restrictions violated fundamental separation of 
powers principles.27 
The Bergdahl exchange is the most recent example of the tension 
between the executive and legislative branches over the conduct and 
funding of national security–related matters.  This conflict stems largely 
from each branch’s perception of the proper scope of its powers, as well as 
the dynamic nature of wartime operations and their resistance to easy 
classification as either “tactics” subject to presidential discretion or “policy” 
subject to congressional oversight.28  As the United States has moved 
increasingly toward short-term, limited engagements overseas, the issue has 
become more relevant and contentious.29 
 
 21. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.  This provision incorporated an identical 
notification requirement from the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). See 
Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 672. 
 22. Krishnadev Calamur, Bergdahl Swap Was ‘Extraordinary Situation,’ Hagel Says, 
NPR (June 11, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2014/06/11/320969162/hagel-to-face-skeptical-lawmakers-over-bergdahl-trade. 
 23. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2014). 
 24. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1; Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 
YALE L.J. 1343, 1374–77 (1988) (discussing the Antideficiency Act and the principle of 
appropriations control). 
 25. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 6–7. 
 26. See id. at 5–6. 
 27. See id. at 6; DOD, Administration Views Provided to the Government Accountability 
Office, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/GAO-
Response-question-3-FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 28. See Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress:  
Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 404 (2008) (“Virtually all 
important decisions as to the conduct of a war . . . can be framed as either ‘tactical’ military 
decisions for the President to make as Commander in Chief or broad policy decisions for 
Congress to make under its war powers.”). 
 29. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 944–45 (2008); see also JAMES E. 
BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE 99 (2007); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 5 (2013). 
2842 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Indeed, the War on Terror’s “unusual entwinement with the home front, 
its heavy focus on preemptive action and intelligence collection, and its 
targeting of a diffuse, non-state enemy, all guarantee that presidential uses 
of force are likely to be conducted for years to come in a context that is 
thick with statutory restrictions.”30  Yet there is no clear answer from the 
courts over the degree to which Congress may restrain the ability of the 
President to negotiate the recovery of American prisoners of war in 
exchange for U.S.-held detainees.31 
This Note examines the origins of the conflict over the Bergdahl-Taliban 
exchange and ultimately concludes that the President had the constitutional 
power to authorize the exchange.  Part I explores the historical development 
of defense appropriations and contextualizes the conflict over national 
security spending within a broader constitutional framework, focusing on 
the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches and 
the judiciary’s reluctance to intervene.  This part includes an evaluation of 
the President’s powers as Commander in Chief and the traditional practice 
of congressional deference to executive leadership in matters pertaining to 
the recovery of U.S. captives during hostilities. 
In Part II, this Note examines the current controversy over whether the 
Obama Administration failed to comply with the terms of the 2014 CAA 
and ADA.  In doing so, this Note addresses the separation of powers 
implications raised by the dispute.  Congress, on the one hand, has viewed 
its funding restrictions on transfers and releases from Guantánamo as an 
appropriate means of governing the conduct of war.  The President, on the 
other hand, has argued that, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, he 
is the only person entrusted with the discretion to determine detainee policy 
and to ensure the safe repatriation of American servicemembers.  Finally, in 
Part III, this Note argues that Congress, by severely limiting the President’s 
ability to negotiate for the release of an American POW, abused its power 
of the purse and infringed on the President’s authority as Commander in 
Chief. 
I.   THE SWORD AND THE PURSE:  
THE BALANCE BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS 
Throughout American history, the power of the purse has been one of the 
most effective means of legislative control of defense policy, which is 
executed by the President in his role as Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces.  Part I.A.1 discusses the origins of the appropriations doctrine and 
analyzes several of its historical applications.  Part I.A.2 outlines the 
historical and textual basis for the President’s authority as Commander in 
Chief.  Part I.B surveys U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence evaluating the 
appropriate scope of executive power, focusing on the tripartite scheme 
 
 30. Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 945. 
 31. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War Power, 35 PRES. STUDIES Q. 466 
(2005) (contrasting pre- and post-Vietnam War judicial responses to challenges of the 
President’s war powers); Lobel, supra note 28, at 408–09 (discussing the judiciary’s refusal 
to address cases relating to tension between legislative and executive powers). 
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articulated in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer32 as the most appropriate method for determining the 
legitimacy of presidential action.  Part I.C examines several practical 
examples of the overlapping spheres of defense appropriations riders, 
congressional notification requirements, and negotiations over the recovery 
of captured U.S. military personnel, drawing from them broader 
conclusions about agreed-upon standards for legislative and executive 
conduct in these areas. 
A.   Textual and Historical Origins of the Tension 
Between Congress’s Defense Spending Power 
and the President’s Authority As Commander in Chief 
The U.S. Constitution’s grant of the power of the purse to Congress is an 
“empowerment of the legislature [that] is at the foundation of our 
constitutional order.”33  Congress often has exercised that authority in the 
context of defense spending, using it as a tool to set and enforce broad 
policy objectives.34  Likewise, the President’s authority as Commander in 
Chief has deep historical roots that directly explain the scope of his 
authority to coordinate the recovery of captured U.S. servicemembers.35  
The power of the purse and the Commander-in-Chief power are not always 
mutually exclusive—there have been many historical instances of overlap 
and controversy.  This section explains how each doctrine has developed. 
1.   Congress’s Defense Spending Power 
Within democratic governments, the authority to raise revenue has long 
been recognized as one of a legislature’s most fundamental powers.36  The 
British Parliament, one of the antecedents to the U.S. Congress, exercised 
its power of the purse over national security affairs consistently but not 
uniformly, often supplying the military only in exchange for concessions 
from the King.37  American colonial assemblies, Congress’s other principal 
legislative model, frequently seized on opportunities presented by military 
emergencies to expand their political control.38  This system broke down 
during the Revolutionary War, however, when “the exigencies of war” 
revealed the inefficiency of battlefield decisions being made by committees 
far from the front lines.39 
 
 32. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 33. Stith, supra note 24, at 1344. 
 34. See discussion infra Part I.A.1. 
 35. See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 36. See Stith, supra note 24, at 1344. 
 37. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND 
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 16–17 (1994). 
 38. In 1715, for example, Virginia’s House of Burgesses granted funding for defense 
against attacks by Native Americans only on the condition that the governor repeal an 
unpopular tobacco act. See id. at 19. 
 39. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb:  Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 
778 (2008). 
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Congress retained the power of the purse upon ratification of the 
Constitution largely as a check on executive power.40  Article I, Section 9 
of the Constitution states, “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”41  This 
“structural imperative” ensures that the President may not withdraw funds 
on his own initiative, for whatever reason.42  Legislative authority over 
defense appropriations is further codified in Article I, Section 8, which 
grants Congress the powers to “raise and support Armies”43 and “provide 
and maintain a Navy”44 and was largely drafted in response to war-making 
abuses by the Crown.45  These provisions, when combined with the power 
“to declare [w]ar,”46 seemed to give the legislative branch control over the 
broader aspects of defense policy.47 
At first, Congress exercised this appropriation power through a linear 
process of request, authorization, and appropriation.48  This distinction was 
sharpest before the Civil War, when congressional appropriations contained 
only the duration, amount, and purpose of the granted funds.49  Over time, 
the line between authorizations and appropriations began to blur, as funding 
grants contained more and more restrictions in the form of riders designed 
to limit executive discretion over a given program.50  Through World War 
II, though, defense appropriations were largely immune to this trend, 
remaining mostly “no strings attached” checks given to the President to 
spend as he saw fit during various war efforts.51  However, beginning in the 
1950s, increasing congressional skepticism over military and covert actions 
prompted Congress to seek additional oversight through the imposition of 
various riders to defense spending bills, with the understanding that the 
President may not spend funds Congress has granted him unless he 
complies with the conditions Congress sets.52 
 
 40. See Stith, supra note 24, at 1349. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 42. Stith, supra note 24, at 1349–50. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 44. Id. cl. 13. 
 45. See Louis Fisher, Presidential Power in National Security:  A Guide to the 
President-Elect, 39 PRES. STUDIES Q. 347, 353 (2009) (“The British model gave the king the 
absolute power to make war.  The framers repudiated that form of government 
because . . . [t]he resulting military adventures were disastrous to their countries, both in 
lives lost and treasures squandered.”). 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 47. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (1952) (These 
clauses “certainly lay[] upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces.  
Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and their appropriation and may determine in 
what manner and by what means they shall be spent for military and naval procurement.”); 
Fisher, supra note 45, at 354. 
 48. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE 
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 102–16 (2005); BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 37, at 43–
45. 
 49. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 37, at 45. 
 50. See id. at 46–47. 
 51. See id. at 47–48. 
 52. See id. at 48–53; see also infra Part I.C.1–2. 
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2.   The President’s Authority As Commander in Chief 
In the British military, commanders in chief, just like the King himself, 
depended on parliamentary appropriations for supplies and pay, and the 
position “had very little, if any, discretion to act in contravention of 
Parliament.”53  This system became the model for the Continental Army, of 
which the Continental Congress appointed George Washington “General 
and Commander in [C]hief, of the army of the United Colonies,” in June 
1775.54  The Founders curtailed Washington’s powers as Commander in 
Chief even further than Parliament had restricted the King, so that rather 
than “hav[ing] sole power to conduct warfare,” Washington could merely 
“direct military campaigns subject to legislative oversight.”55 
Such oversight was rarely smooth, however.  Friction between the 
Continental Congress and Washington led to various military setbacks 
throughout the Revolutionary War,56 and the problem was especially 
apparent under exigent circumstances.57  In response to these tactical 
failures, the Continental Congress allowed for a “gradual but substantial 
augmentation” of Washington’s power during the latter years of the war.58 
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 recorded only a 
“limited discussion” of the issue.59  As a means of mitigating the threat 
posed by an unchecked executive, the Framers consciously “rejected a 
government in which a single branch could both make war and fund it.”60  
The Constitution solidified the President’s singular role as Commander in 
Chief of the armed forces61 while also requiring him to recruit, equip, train, 
and deploy those forces only with money granted by Congress.62  Beyond 
this basic alignment of sword and state, neither the text of the Constitution 
nor the records of the Convention and ratification process offers much 
insight into the intended scope of the President’s powers as Commander in 
Chief.63 
 
 53. Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 773. 
 54. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 96 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford et al. eds., 1905). 
 55. Lobel, supra note 28, at 419. 
 56. See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE 333–558 (2005). 
 57. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 779–80. 
 58. Id. at 779. But see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 78 (1990) (As President, George 
Washington “took military action only once without express congressional authorization, 
and even then, Congress arguably endorsed his decision by subsequent acts.”). 
 59. Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 792.  According to Barron and Lederman, 
though, it is a “common assumption” that the Framers “were specifically aiming to prevent 
the sorts of inefficiencies that characterized the earlier regime, when the Continental 
Congress had micromanaged General Washington.” Id. at 779. 
 60. Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 J. AM. INT’L 
L. 758, 762 (1989). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States.”). 
 62. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; cl. 12–13. 
 63. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 788 (“The most that can be said about 
which branch ultimately should be in control of the ‘direction’ of the armed forces, in light 
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Congress directly regulated the military in the early days of the Republic, 
dictating the organization of the armed forces as well as the qualifications 
for who could join them.64  Later, during the Civil War, President Abraham 
Lincoln acted several times in his capacity as Commander in Chief with 
neither congressional permission nor appropriation, but each time returned 
to the legislature for ex post confirmation of and funding for his decisions.65  
This “give and take” continued through World Wars I and II, with Congress 
regulating general military functions while avoiding intrusion into tactical 
decision making.66 
Regulation, moreover, was not equivalent to command, as Congress still 
recognized the need for presidential discretion in the handling of specific 
troop movements and the recovery of captured U.S. personnel.67  Congress 
enshrined this principle in the National Security Act of 1947,68 which 
“place[d] American governmental decisions regarding war making, 
intelligence, covert operations, military sales, and military aid under the 
executive’s unified and coordinated control.”69  Since its enactment, 
controversy has arisen over the ability of the executive branch to initiate 
war, but never over its authority to dictate tactical decisions.70  Throughout 
this period, the President also has engaged in various negotiations and 
agreements with state and non-state actors, often for the return of captured 
Americans.71 
B.   Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Scope of Executive Authority 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the balance 
between the spending and Commander-in-Chief powers, its holdings on 
somewhat analogous issues provide insight into how that balance might be 
 
of the available evidence, is that the Framers did not assign that function at all in the text of 
the Constitution.”); see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 46, 190 (2010). 
 64. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 957. 
 65. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases:  
Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53–92 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 66. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1034–55. 
 67. See generally id. See also infra Part I.C.3. 
 68. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 69. KOH, supra note 58, at 102. 
 70. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1059–98.  Overall, “the [P]resident 
remains at the center of the national security process” because he alone “speak[s] on behalf 
of the United States in a way that congressional and other national leaders cannot. . . .  In 
addition, in time of crisis it is the president who often decides on whether and how to use the 
national security tools that are the product of legislative authorization and appropriation.” 
BAKER, supra note 29, at 101. 
 71. See, e.g., MITCHELL B. REISS, NEGOTIATING WITH EVIL:  WHEN TO TALK TO 
TERRORISTS 11–12 (2010) (listing various examples, including payment of the Barbary 
pirates under three Presidents, concessions to a Berber chieftain by President Theodore 
Roosevelt, and the transfer of weapons to Iran under President Ronald Reagan); David 
Ignatius, Tea with the Taliban?, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2008, at B7 (describing the early 
efforts of the George W. Bush Administration to enter peace negotiations in Afghanistan 
despite the ongoing conflict). 
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struck.  This section provides an overview of the Supreme Court decisions 
relevant to analyzing the Bergdahl-Taliban prisoner exchange. 
The Supreme Court has implied that the President possesses exclusive 
power not explicitly stated in Article II, but that the independent war 
powers conferred by the Commander in Chief Clause are still subject to 
undefined statutory limitations.72  This gap has led one scholar to conclude 
that “Congress may constitutionally constrain the President as long as the 
legislative action does not violate a mandatory provision or express 
restriction of the Constitution and does not impede on an exclusive 
presidential power.”73  Just as “a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President,”74 neither, as Chief Justice John Marshall once observed, are “the 
whole powers of war” vested in Congress.75  The Court has addressed this 
tension in three main decisions. 
1.   United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.:  What Are the Limits 
of Presidential Discretion over Foreign Affairs? 
The Supreme Court first evaluated the degree to which the powers of the 
federal government vary between foreign (“external”) and domestic 
(“internal”) affairs in its 1936 decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp.76  Seeking to curb American involvement in the Chaco War 
between Bolivia and Paraguay, Congress passed a joint resolution in 1934 
empowering the President to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions to any 
party in the conflict.77  President Franklin Roosevelt soon issued a 
proclamation implementing the ban, which remained in place for over a 
 
 72. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 772; Fisher, supra note 45, at 352 
(“Although some justices of the Supreme Court have described the president’s foreign 
relations power as ‘exclusive,’ the Court itself has not denied to Congress its constitutional 
authority to enter the field and reverse or modify presidential decisions in the area of 
national security and foreign affairs.”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Presidential Power and 
National Security, 37 PRES. STUDIES Q. 101, 110–120 (2007) (analyzing the balance between 
executive prerogative and legislative oversight in the area of national defense). 
 73. William M. Hains, Comment, Challenging the Executive:  The Constitutionality of 
Congressional Regulation of the President’s Wartime Detention Policies, 2011 BYU L. REV. 
2283, 2284.  Hains based most of his legal analysis of congressional control over 
Guantánamo policy on Professor Lobel’s framework for evaluating shared and exclusive 
governmental powers. See id. at 2297–2300; Lobel, supra note 28, at 445–51; see also KOH, 
supra note 58, at 4 (“Although the National Security Constitution has assigned the president 
the predominant role in making foreign policy decisions, it has granted him only limited 
exclusive powers.  Thus, the Constitution directs most governmental decisions regarding 
foreign affairs into a sphere of concurrent authority, under presidential management, but 
bounded by the checks provided by congressional consultation and judicial review.”); Fisher, 
supra note 45, at 354 (The title of Commander in Chief “was never intended to give the 
president sole power to initiate war and determine its scope.  Such an interpretation would 
nullify the express powers given to Congress under Article I and undercut the framers’ 
determination to place the power of war with the elected representatives of Congress.”). 
 74. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
 75. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). 
 76. 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, supra note 65, at 195–232. 
 77. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311–13. 
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year.78  The Court considered the scope of the non-delegation doctrine, 
finding that, by granting the President the authority to validate their 
resolution, Congress did not “abdicate[] its essential functions [by] 
delegat[ing] them to the Executive.”79 
The Court’s analysis also more broadly examined the President’s unique 
power to dictate U.S. foreign affairs.80  The Court explained that Congress 
only plays a limited role in foreign affairs because, “[i]n this vast external 
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the 
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation.”81  Although the President makes treaties with the “Advice and 
Consent of the Senate,”82 for example, “he alone negotiates” their terms.83  
The Court further concluded that the President, as “the sole organ of the 
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations,”84 has discretion to act beyond the powers specifically enumerated 
in Article II.85  This responsibility reflects the special trust inherent to the 
office, giving the President latitude to act with “caution and unity of 
design” toward foreign nations.86 
The Court then clarified the role of Congress in relation to the President, 
concluding that legislation affecting external affairs must grant the 
President “freedom from statutory restriction which would not be 
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved[, because] . . . he, not 
Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.”87  
The opinion concluded with a warning about the “unwisdom” of narrow 
congressional resolutions meant to control the President’s discretion in 
external affairs.88 
2.   Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:  
When May the President Act in Contravention of Congressional Will? 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court 
considered whether President Harry Truman’s seizure of steel mills to avert 
a labor crisis during the Korean War fell within the scope of his inherent 
 
 78. See id. at 312–13. 
 79. Id. at 315. 
 80. See id. at 319–22. 
 81. Id. at 319. 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 83. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. 
 84. Id. (quoting then-Congressman John Marshall, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)). 
 85. See id. at 320. But see Louis Fisher, The Sole Organ Doctrine, STUDIES ON 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN RELATIONS, STUDY NO. 1 (Law Library of Cong. 2006), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/SoleOrgan-Aug06.pdf (criticizing 
the popular use of Curtiss-Wright as justification for the existence of independent 
presidential power in foreign affairs). 
 86. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. 
 87. Id. at 320 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 321–22. 
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executive authority.89  In reaching its conclusion that the executive order 
authorizing the seizure violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court also offered a broader examination of the 
appropriate allocation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches.90  President Truman, the government argued, had been motivated 
to act not out of greed or hunger for power.91  Instead, his fear of the 
damage to the overseas war effort that could result from even a brief strike 
led President Truman to exercise his “inherent power” as the country’s 
chief executive and Commander in Chief.92  This inherent power, the 
government urged, was “supported by the Constitution, by historical 
precedent, and by court decisions.”93 
The Court disagreed.  Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, stated 
that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either 
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”94  In this case, the 
fact that Congress already had considered and rejected the use of seizures to 
help resolve labor disputes left only the Constitution as a possible source 
for executive authority.95  However, Article II restricts the President’s 
“functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks 
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.”96  Congress could have 
authorized the seizure of steel mills, but it did not; therefore, the President’s 
decision to do so anyway was an invalid exercise of legislative power by 
the executive branch.97 
Justice Jackson famously concurred in the opinion.98  He began by 
addressing the need for a pragmatic approach in resolving competing 
legislative and executive claims, one based on an understanding of the 
entire document and the history of interaction among the branches.99  
Because “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon 
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress,”100 Justice Jackson 
announced a tripartite scheme for evaluating the constitutionality of 
presidential action in relation to Congress.101 
 
 89. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). See 
generally Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
STORIES, supra note 65, at 233. 
 90. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–89. 
 91. See id. at 583. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 584 (quoting government’s motion in opposition to a preliminary injunction). 
 94. Id. at 585. 
 95. See id. at 586–87. 
 96. Id. at 587. 
 97. See id. at 588. 
 98. See id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring); KOH, supra note 58, at 105; Lobel, supra 
note 28, at 445. 
 99. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (“The actual art of governing under our 
Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 635–38. 
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In the first category, the President’s “authority is at its maximum” when 
he “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”102  
These actions are “supported by the strongest of presumptions and [given] 
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation”103 because they are fully 
aligned with the Constitution and conducted with the sum of congressional 
and presidential authority.104  In Youngstown, Congress did not just fail to 
authorize the mill seizures, it repeatedly refused to do so.105 
Alternatively, in the second category outlined in the concurring opinion, 
the President can still act on his own authority if Congress is silent on a 
particular issue.106  This category is especially relevant in times of 
congressional backlog or disinterest, and courts will often interpret silence 
on the part of Congress as consent to the presidential action.107  Actions in 
this category exist in a “zone of twilight in which [the President] and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.”108  Within this second category, a judicial analysis will be 
highly contextual, a theme echoed in the Court’s remarks on the appropriate 
interpretation of constitutional ambiguities.109  Here, Congress took action 
and directly addressed the issue, providing several alternative channels for 
the seizure of private property.110  The Truman Administration’s refusal to 
use any of these methods could not be justified by a lack of available 
options.111 
Finally, the third category involves presidential action that runs contrary 
to congressional will, either express or implied.112  Under these 
circumstances, the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.”113  Justice Jackson acknowledged that 
the President does, in fact, possess some inherent, or non-delegated, 
powers.114  These powers alone, though, usually are not sufficient to 
overcome explicit congressional rejection of a given action.115 
 
 102. Id. at 635. 
 103. Id. at 637. 
 104. Id. at 635–37. 
 105. See Bellia, supra note 89, at 241–42. 
 106. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. (“[A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”). 
 110. See id. at 639. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. at 637. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 640; see also id. at 653 (identifying and discussing “the gap that exists 
between the President’s paper powers and his real powers”). 
 115. See id. at 640; see also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (resolving a 
conflict between the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to seize foreign vessels 
during war and Congress’s ability to limit that power via statute).  The Little Court held that 
a statute will prevail over a conflicting presidential proclamation, even in a time of war, 
because “the legislature seem[s] to have prescribed . . . the manner in which [the] law shall 
2015] PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PRISONER EXCHANGES 2851 
3.   Dames & Moore v. Regan:  
Is Congressional Silence Tantamount to Acquiescence? 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,116 the Supreme Court addressed the degree 
to which the President’s power to conduct foreign affairs may translate to 
domestic issues.117  The Court applied the Youngstown framework to find 
that an executive order issued with the acquiescence of Congress was a 
valid exercise of the President’s authority, thus taking a deferential view of 
executive power to dictate “the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute 
between our country and another.”118 
To resolve the Iran hostage crisis, during which several dozen U.S. 
diplomats and citizens were held captive in Tehran for almost fifteen 
months,119 President Jimmy Carter agreed on behalf of the United States to 
terminate all litigation between its nationals and the government of Iran.120  
Because of the close ties between the deposed Shah of Iran and the United 
States, there had been many U.S. businesses operating in Iran who had 
brought suits in U.S. courts to recover on property or contracts in Iran that 
had been devalued, nullified, or placed at risk by the sudden regime change 
there.121  President Carter issued—and President Ronald Reagan later 
confirmed—an executive agreement implementing the terms of the 
settlement with Iran and establishing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
as the venue for final arbitration of all claims between the nationals and 
governments of the two countries.122  Dames & Moore, an American 
engineering and consulting firm with preexisting claims against the 
government of Iran that were not related to the hostage crisis, challenged 
the validity of the tribunal as the sole venue for satisfaction of its claims.123 
In upholding the executive agreement and cementing the tribunal as a 
legitimate means of resolution,124 the Court also weighed the degree to 
which an executive order stemming from the President’s authority to 
conduct foreign affairs may control the pursuit of lawsuits that had already 
been filed—and, in some cases, decided—in U.S. courts.125  Congress had 
neither authorized nor prohibited the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, 
nor had Congress addressed the agreement establishing it.126  Instead, 
Congress displayed a history of “acquiescence in conduct of the sort 
 
be carried into execution.” Id. at 177–78.  Of course, this conclusion presumes that the 
statute complied with the Constitution in the first place. 
 116. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 117. See id. at 675. 
 118. Id. at 688. 
 119. DAVID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE 1–2 (2004). 
 120. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664–65. 
 121. See Harold H. Bruff, The Story of Dames & Moore:  Resolution of an International 
Crisis by Executive Agreement, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, supra note 65, at 369, 
381–82. 
 122. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664–66. 
 123. See id. at 666–67. 
 124. See id. at 686. 
 125. See id. at 667. 
 126. See id. at 678–79; see also Bruff, supra note 121, at 381–82. 
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engaged in by the President.”127  According to the Court, this acquiescence, 
when combined with the President’s Article II power to enter the agreement 
with Iran and various historical precedents of presidential resolution of the 
claims of American nationals against foreign governments, placed the 
executive order into the first category identified by Justice Jackson in his 
Youngstown concurrence.128 
The Dames & Moore Court interpreted legislative history of 
congressional silence as proof of congressional consent.129  As such, the 
executive order was “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the 
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”130  By acquiescing to the exercise 
of presidential authority, Congress had given the order tacit approval.131  
The decision also qualified Youngstown by noting that a given executive 
action falls on a spectrum, “not neatly in one of three pigeonholes,” 
especially in cases “involving responses to international crises the nature of 
which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any 
detail.”132  The Court stated that judicial interpretation of legislative intent 
should therefore be more lenient to executive authority in cases involving 
foreign affairs and particularly under emergent or unforeseen 
circumstances, such as the need to negotiate for the release of U.S. 
hostages.133  Executive agreements, made without the consent of the 
Senate, have survived this and subsequent rounds of judicial review as a 
valid exercise of the President’s Article II powers.134 
C.   Practical Precedents Illustrating the Balance 
Between Legislative and Executive War Powers 
Congress repeatedly has tried to check the President’s ability to wage 
war, using assorted means to at least oversee—if not attempt to seize 
outright control of—the executive branch’s conduct of military 
operations.135  The White House has offered various reactions to these 
methods, ranging from unchallenged acceptance, to grudging acquiescence, 
to blatant disregard.136  Two primary methods, appropriations riders and the 
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implementation of requirements for congressional notification and 
consultation, have emerged as both the most effective and the most popular 
congressional tools for checking the President’s war powers.  This section 
will describe several of the ways in which Congress has used these tools to 
attempt to shape national security policy. 
1.   Appropriations Riders As a Means of Congressional Oversight:  
The Boland Amendments and the Iran-Contra Affair 
Appropriations riders, which contain specific conditions on the grant of 
funds and are inserted as amendments to large spending bills, give Congress 
an opportunity to more narrowly tailor the use of federal money.137  As one 
scholar notes, this dimension of the power of the purse has been “one of the 
major factors in shaping and restricting presidential decision making with 
respect to the commitment of forces abroad.”138  Congress has traditionally 
given the President much more discretion over the use of funds during 
times of emergency or conventional war than under circumstances of 
indefinite conflict or terrorist threat.139  Riders to defense spending bills 
therefore have become more common over the last fifty years, as Congress 
has sought to exercise more control over small wars and covert activity.140  
The Iran-Contra Affair combined all of these elements and sparked a 
broader debate about the role of “restrictive national security 
appropriations” in shaping defense policy.141 
The Reagan Administration’s attempts to overthrow the Communist 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the early 1980s were scandalous for 
several reasons.142  Congress, concerned over reports that the White House 
was raising and training the anti-Sandinista Contra movement without 
appropriate oversight, passed an initial spending restriction in 1982.143  This 
amendment to the DOD Appropriations Act prohibited the use of funds for 
military equipment, training, or other activities in support of any group not 
part of the Nicaraguan armed forces.144 
Under the leadership of House Intelligence Committee Chair Edward 
Boland, Congress gradually tightened funding restrictions over the next 
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several years.145  Congress eliminated all funding by 1984, declaring that 
no money designated for intelligence activities “may be obligated or 
expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, 
directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by 
any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.”146  President 
Reagan signed these provisions into law without objection.147 
Despite these restrictions, staff members of the National Security Council 
(a group known as “the Enterprise”) channeled money to the Contras as part 
of a larger scheme to also free U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon by 
Iranian-backed forces.148  The Iran-Contra Affair prompted Congress to 
initiate an investigation into the executive branch’s apparent deceit and 
resolve potential constitutional issues.149  The congressional committee 
concluded that the Enterprise executed a covert Contra aid program by 
raising “private and non-appropriated money[] and without the 
accountability or restrictions imposed by law on the CIA.”150  Moreover, 
this was a program “that Congress thought it had prohibited.”151  Aside 
from the conviction of one member of the Enterprise for the commission of 
several minor offenses, no legal consequences stemmed from the Iran-
Contra Affair.152  Congress issued a series of recommendations at the end 
of its report, reminding the White House that “Congress is the partner, not 
the adversary of the executive branch, in the formulation of policy” and 
calling for a more rigid system of presidential findings related to covert 
action.153 
2.   Consultation and Notification Requirements 
A second method of congressional control over defense policy is the 
enactment of consultation and notification requirements, either through 
attachment to a spending bill or as stand-alone legislation.154  When the 
political system is functioning as designed, the formal framework of 
consultation and notification is often complemented by a less rigid, more ad 
hoc consultative process between the executive and legislative branches that 
is “an essential unwritten ingredient in the national security process.”155  
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Congress also must strike a balance between fulfilling its role as a 
representative body and observing the need for limited transparency in the 
national security context.156  This section will examine two recent efforts by 
Congress to control presidential discretion through the use of reporting 
requirements. 
a.   The War Powers Resolution 
Spurred by the mission creep of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the War 
Powers Resolution was “the product of almost four decades of bipartisan 
effort to recapture legislative authority that had drifted to the President.”157  
The resolution declared that any foreign introduction of U.S. armed forces 
without a declaration of war would require the President to submit a report 
to congressional leaders within forty-eight hours.158  The report must 
contain details about, at a minimum, the circumstances leading to the 
deployment, the constitutional and legislative authority under which the 
President is conducting the military operation, and an estimation of the 
involvement’s scope and duration.159  This reporting requirement remains 
in effect for the duration of the engagement, during which the President 
must submit updates at least every six months.160  Furthermore, the 
engagement must cease after sixty days unless Congress has declared war, 
been incapacitated, or voted to delay the deadline.161 
The War Powers Resolution was controversial during its enactment and 
has been applied unevenly since.162  The first test came in 1975, when 
President Gerald Ford initially sought authorization to evacuate the 
remaining U.S. personnel from Cambodia and South Vietnam, but, after 
growing impatient with congressional delays, unilaterally approved the 
evacuations under his executive authority to protect American lives.163  
Two missions to recover captured Americans, from the Mayaguez 
commercial ship under President Ford and the U.S. embassy in Iran under 
President Carter, have complied with the reporting requirements in letter 
but not in spirit.164  In both cases, the White House circumvented 
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congressional input by waiting to file the report until after the engagement 
had either ceased or “reached the point of no return.”165 
b.   Intelligence Oversight 
Congress possesses similar tools for oversight of the intelligence 
community.166  Passed in the wake of revelations about counterproductive 
covert actions in Latin America and Southeast Asia, the Intelligence 
Oversight Act of 1980167 prohibits the President from authorizing a covert 
action without first making a formal determination that “such an action is 
necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United 
States and is important to the national security of the United States.”168 
This finding must be submitted in writing to the congressional 
intelligence oversight committees prior to the initiation of the covert action, 
unless the President determines that “it is essential to limit access to the 
finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the 
United States.”169  In that case, the President may inform only the chairs 
and ranking minority members of each intelligence committee, as well as 
the majority and minority leaders in both the House and the Senate, as long 
as he provides a written justification for doing so.170  If the President 
complies with neither of these options, he still must inform the intelligence 
committees “in a timely fashion,” along with providing justification for not 
notifying them earlier.171 
Over the years, the Intelligence Oversight Act has been just as riddled as 
the War Powers Resolution with noncompliance and arguments over 
separation of powers.172  From early assertions that “[t]o the extent a covert 
 
 165. Id. at 139.  Prior to the Desert One raid to recover the U.S. personnel from Iran, 
“members of Congress, including the leadership, were not consulted or informed in advance 
of either the preparatory activities or the mission itself.  In such a context, the constitutional 
moment occurred when the president considered and decided not to consult or advise the 
Congress of these actions.” BAKER, supra note 29, at 67. 
 166. These tools include authorization and appropriation, nomination of leaders, 
congressional hearings, investigations, treaty ratification, and the Government 
Accountability Office.  See ERIC ROSENBACH & AKI J. PERITZ, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L 
AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., CONFRONTATION OR COLLABORATION?  CONGRESS AND 
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 20–21 (2009), available at http://belfercenter.ksg. 
harvard.edu/files/IC-book-finalasof12JUNE.pdf; Legislative Oversight of Intelligence, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-
nation/intelligence-oversight/legislative-oversight-of-intelligence.html (last visited Mar. 25, 
2015). 
 167. Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981–82 (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C.). 
 168. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a) (2014); see also ROSENBACH & PERITZ, supra note 166, at 28–
30. 
 169. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(1)–(2). 
 170. See id. § 3093(c)(2).  This group comprises the so-called Gang of Eight. KOH, supra 
note 58, at 58. 
 171. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(3). 
 172. See KOH, supra note 58, at 58–60; see also James F. Basile, Congressional 
Assertiveness, Executive Authority and the Intelligence Oversight Act:  A New Threat to the 
Separation of Powers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 571, 580 (1989) (“[T]hose who conduct 
foreign policy cannot be subject to the regularity of legal norms.  Quick action in response to 
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action is analogous to a military action, . . . the President as Commander-in-
Chief retains complete control over” a given operation,173 to debates over 
whether CIA drone strikes constitute covert actions,174 the executive branch 
has repeatedly sought to confine the scope of congressional control over 
covert actions.  Likewise, Congress has attempted to tie intelligence 
appropriations to committee oversight of CIA interrogation techniques and 
warrantless surveillance.175 
3.   Presidential Control of Wartime 
Prisoner Detention and Recovery Policy 
Another area in which concerns over separation of powers have played 
out is the disposition and treatment of enemy captives during times of 
armed conflict, as well as the often-related efforts to recover U.S. 
captives.176  Historical analysis is especially relevant here, as the 
controversy over which political branch should exert control over detainee 
policy has never come directly before the Supreme Court.177  Further, as 
Justice Frankfurter wrote in Youngstown, “a systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and 
never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ 
vested in the President.”178  Congressional deference to presidential 
decisions on the treatment and disposition of enemy captives and the proper 
methods of recovering American prisoners seems to provide just such a 
“gloss.”179 
This section explores the history of American treatment of enemy 
captives and efforts at recovering U.S. servicemembers.  These examples 
 
fluid situations cannot be slowed by the legal restraints normally imposed on other policy 
areas.”). 
 173. Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1083–84 (quoting Oversight Legislation:  
Hearings on S. 1721 and S. 1818 Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong. 
181–82 (1987) (statement of Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel)). 
 174. See Todd C. Huntley & Andrew D. Levitz, Controlling the Use of Power in the 
Shadows:  Challenges in the Application of Jus In Bello to Clandestine and Unconventional 
Warfare Activities, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 461, 467 (2014). 
 175. See ROSENBACH & PAVITZ, supra note 166, at 25. 
 176. The term “captive” is intentionally ambiguous, describing both prisoners of war, 
who must be afforded full protections under the United States’ international obligations, and 
other detainees, whose legal status is either uncertain or does not entitle them to the full 
extent of these protections. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].  
Additionally, “[t]he President’s power as Commander in Chief to dispose of the liberty of 
individuals captured during military engagements is not limited to those who are entitled to 
prisoner of war status.” Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 20 (Mar. 13, 2002), 
available at https://ccrjustice.org/files/memorandum03132002.pdf. 
 177. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636–37 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Court has jurisdiction over detainee controversies only if they involve 
conflicts over statutory regulations). 
 178. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 179. Id.; see also Pearlstein, supra note 18, at 629–30. 
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focus on nontraditional detainees while offering a comprehensive view of 
the longstanding tradition of presidential control over detainee policy in 
conflicts large and small, against a variety of both state and non-state actors, 
within the United States and around the world.  The President often has 
executed prisoner transfers and releases as part of a broader effort to 
repatriate American captives, a policy over which he has consistently 
exercised exclusive control. 
a.   The Revolutionary War 
Under the British model from which the colonists derived their 
understanding of a commander in chief, “the Crown had absolute authority 
to dispose as it saw fit of prisoners of war and other detainees.”180  Once the 
Revolutionary War erupted, British field commanders, not their civilian 
counterparts, executed local control over POW policy by acting under the 
authority of the King.181  As Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, 
George Washington mirrored this approach by taking responsibility for the 
treatment of over 14,000 captured enemy soldiers and sailors.182  A system 
of local prisoner exchanges developed early in the Revolution and quickly 
became essential to the reciprocal treatment of POWs.183  Within this 
system, senior officers “were usually exchanged by direct correspondence 
and agreements between General Washington” and British military 
leadership with little to no input from Congress.184 
The only exception seems to have arisen in the case of the “Convention 
Army,” a unit of almost 6000 British, Hessian, and Canadian captives 
designated for transport to and release in Canada under an agreement 
reached in the field between American and British generals.185  Congress, 
however, refused to acknowledge the agreement, likely balking at the sheer 
number of captives who would be set free and the gentlemanly 
circumstances under which it was negotiated.186  Instead, “a jurisdictional 
dispute” emerged between Congress and the American general who 
 
 180. John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2004). But 
see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS:  FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 168–74 (2010) 
(arguing that the British judiciary oversaw the detention conditions of prisoners of war and 
regularly considered applications for their release). 
 181. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1204. 
 182. See ROBERT C. DOYLE, THE ENEMY IN OUR HANDS:  AMERICA’S TREATMENT OF 
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 11–12 (2010). 
 183. See id.  The exchange system, although decentralized, became the most efficient 
means for disposing of prisoners. See PAUL J. SPRINGER, AMERICA’S CAPTIVES:  TREATMENT 
OF POWS FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR 41 (2010) (“[A]ny 
efforts made to utilize prisoners for any purpose other than exchange proved mostly 
counterproductive.”). 
 184. DOYLE, supra note 182, at 13.  Indeed, captured “British officer[s] . . . often received 
paroles of honor within a designated area and, at their own expense, found quarters in private 
homes or inns while they awaited exchange.” Id. at 30; see also SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 
15 (“Washington was under the command of Congress, but he was given great leeway in the 
daily operations of [prisoner] policies.”). 
 185. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 15–16; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 21–22. 
 186. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 16; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 22. 
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brokered the deal, with only the British leader and several of his staff 
officers—the most valuable detainees according to the metric in place at the 
time—being released.187  Commanders gradually arranged for the exchange 
of the rest of the “Convention Army” over the course of the War, however, 
without further congressional interruption.188  This episode is also notable 
for the intentional grouping of mercenary Hessian forces, who were not 
representing a state party to the conflict, with British regulars, who 
represented the Crown.189 
b.   The Civil War 
By the commencement of the Civil War, the trend toward decentralized 
military execution of detainee policy dictated by the President as 
Commander in Chief had been cemented through conflicts of various 
intensities.190  As such, detainees held by the Union, whether military or 
civilian, were “subject to the exclusive control of the President” through the 
intermediaries of cabinet officials and field officers.191 
Parole, or the release of enemy prisoners on the condition that they not 
reengage in hostilities, became customary during the first several years of 
the war despite Union refusal to recognize Confederate forces as 
representatives of a sovereign state.192  In 1864, however, recognizing that 
paroles and exchanges undermined the Union’s manpower advantage, 
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and General Ulysses Grant forbade both 
practices without any congressional consultation, notification, or 
opposition.193 
c.   World War II 
In the opening years of World War II, the Allied Powers mostly used 
enemy captives as cheap sources of labor on the front in which they were 
captured.194  As the war progressed, President Franklin Roosevelt, in 
consultation with the Secretary of War and the newly created War 
Manpower Commission, experimented with a new policy:  the transfer of 
captives from Europe to camps on American soil, primarily around cities 
 
 187. DOYLE, supra note 182, at 16. 
 188. See id. at 25.  “Congress issued contradictory orders that were often ignored by field 
commanders and state governments.” SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 15. 
 189. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 23. 
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Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne tribes who had been captured during the Indian Wars but 
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180, at 1206–10 (discussing prisoner policy during the Quasi-War with France in the late 
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 191. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1213. 
 192. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 89, 92. 
 193. See id. at 94.  The Union paroled or exchanged at least twice as many Confederate 
troops as the Confederacy did Union troops. See id. at 111. 
 194. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1217–18. 
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along the eastern seaboard.195  All told, the War Department housed 
425,000 enemy captives in hundreds of camps throughout the United States, 
with German soldiers comprising the majority of the captured 
population.196  This system remained in effect for the duration of the war 
without any congressional opposition, despite repeated escapes and the 
heightened risk of domestic sabotage.197 
d.   The Vietnam War 
Starting with the Westmoreland-Co Agreement in 1965, the United 
States contracted to transfer all enemy captives in the Vietnam War, 
regardless of status, to South Vietnamese control.198  This development, a 
formal arrangement between the commander of American forces in country 
and the South Vietnamese Minister of Defense, marked a continuation of 
the overall trend toward local or regional military control over enemy 
captives in support of a broader policy articulated at the executive level.199 
Once this framework had been established, American officials began to 
pursue the return of American captives.200  From covert raids to more 
transparent measures such as exchanges, no option seemed to be completely 
off the table.201  One State Department proposal included offering ransom 
by transferring funds directly to the North Vietnamese in exchange for the 
release of American prisoners.202  The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately 
rejected the idea, however, citing concerns over the dangerous precedential 
value and the propaganda exploitations of such an approach.203  As one 
historian notes, “[a]doption of ransom as the official policy of the U.S. 
government received no further serious consideration, then or later.”204 
Prisoner exchanges offered a more viable option, although only after the 
United States offered a clandestine channel for negotiations to take place 
with the Viet Cong.205  When the South Vietnamese government found out 
about the negotiations, however, the United States denied any involvement 
and reiterated its refusal to negotiate with non-state actors like the Viet 
Cong.206  Instead, reciprocal release, “a de facto, informal exchange” in 
 
 195. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 179–80; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 151–61. 
 196. See Arnold Krammer, Japanese Prisoners of War in America, 52 PAC. HIST. REV. 
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U.S. POW RESCUE EFFORTS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (1998). 
 202. See DAVIS, supra note 198, at 104–05. 
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which “one party to a conflict returns one or more prisoners of war to the 
other side in the hope that the enemy will respond by freeing a 
corresponding number of captives,” became the rule for the rest of the 
war.207  This system tilted mostly in favor of the Northern Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong, many more of whom were released than Americans and South 
Vietnamese.208 
In terms of POW policy during the Vietnam War, congressional action 
was initially limited to comments from “individual members, speaking 
about the problems of POW/MIA families among their constituencies or 
reacting to an isolated event in the current news.”209  Starting in 1969 with 
the implementation of DOD’s “Go Public Campaign,”210 Congress used 
rallies, floor speeches, and formal statements to try to raise awareness of the 
abuses being suffered by American captives.211  This movement eventually 
culminated in the passage, unanimously in both Houses, of a resolution 
protesting prisoner treatment and urging the North Vietnamese government 
to honor the framework established in the Geneva Conventions.212  The 
resolution also “approve[d] and endorse[d] efforts by the United States 
Government” to work toward the release of American servicemembers, 
even though at that point the executive branch continued to handle all 
negotiations.213  This trend continued throughout the rest of the peace 
process, which involved extensive discussions on the proper disposition of 
captured servicemembers.214  Although some members of Congress 
travelled to Paris to participate in negotiations, they did so as individuals.215  
Institutional participation by Congress never rose to the level of negotiating 
or overseeing U.S. recovery efforts.216 
 
 207. Id. at 90; see also SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 188. 
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e.   The Global War on Terror Before 2009 
The Global War on Terror, commenced after the attacks of September 
11, 2001, has been no exception to the historical practice of presidential 
discretion in handling detainee and POW exchange policies.217  After some 
internal debate, the administration of President George W. Bush declared 
that al Qaeda and Taliban forces taken captive in Afghanistan were non-
state actors and therefore not privy to the same protections as POWs.218  
Housed at Guantánamo Bay, the detainees dwelled in legal limbo as the 
administration struggled to define which protections it would afford them 
instead of those granted by the Geneva Conventions.219  Congress remained 
on the sideline for much of this conversation, passing the Detainee 
Treatment Act220 and Military Commissions Act221 only after the revelation 
of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and the striking down by the Supreme 
Court of the judicial procedures settled on by the executive branch, 
respectively.222 
Indeed, “[t]o the limited extent that the legislative body was involved in 
detention policy, Congress cooperated with the administration in the 
effort . . . to give the president maximum flexibility and discretion to deal 
with detainees as he saw fit.”223  From the first use of Guantánamo as a 
detention facility in January 2002 until the establishment of Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals three years later, the President transferred 142 
detainees to other countries without any congressional input or 
notification.224  In total, the Bush Administration transferred over 500 
detainees from Guantánamo to foreign custody,225 with Congress “quick to 
give the President whatever authority he asked for, exercising only the most 
modest oversight” of detainee transfers.226  This policy of acquiescence 
changed almost immediately after President Obama took office, as members 
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of Congress expressed concern over the President’s executive order 
requiring the closure of Guantánamo by January 2010.227 
II.   DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
TO EXCHANGE TALIBAN DETAINEES FOR AN AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR 
DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OR RELEASE 
OF GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES? 
The transfer of one million dollars and five Taliban detainees to Qatar in 
exchange for the release of Sergeant Bergdahl seems to fall into the third 
Youngstown category (i.e., executive authority at its nadir) because it 
appears to contravene express congressional will.  The power to negotiate 
for the release of American prisoners of war, however, always has fallen 
squarely within the President’s power as Commander in Chief,228 as has his 
ability to determine the disposition of enemy captives.229  There would be 
no question of the exchange’s constitutionality had Congress not attached 
funding or notification restrictions to the transfer of detainees from 
Guantánamo.  Based on this, which authority takes priority, Congress’s 
power to spend or the President’s power as Commander in Chief? 
Part II.A considers the origins of the conflict between the Obama 
Administration and Congress over the transfer of detainees from 
Guantánamo to either domestic prisons or foreign control and describes the 
legislative environment underlying the passage of the 2014 NDAA.  Part 
II.B looks at the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange itself, which was the 
culmination of several years of negotiation between the United States and 
the Taliban.  Part II.C surveys the immediate congressional and executive 
responses to the exchange before addressing the competing constitutional 
claims made by Congress and the President. 
A.   Congressional Attempts to Control Detainee Policy 
Through Its Power of the Purse 
The use of facilities at the American naval station at Guantánamo Bay for 
the detention of captives in the Global War on Terror was controversial 
from the start.230  After diplomatic and security concerns led to the rejection 
of prisons throughout Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, the Pacific, and 
even onboard ships at sea, the State Department also recoiled at transferring 
detainees to American soil.231  The naval base at Guantánamo Bay, on the 
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other hand, possessed several unique features—geographic isolation, 
preexisting infrastructure, and freedom from diplomatic wrangling with a 
potential host country—that could prove beneficial as the United States 
sorted out the detainees’ legal status.232  As Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld explained, “I would characterize Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as the 
least worst place we could have selected.”233 
Over the next several years, legal and human rights analysts challenged 
both the conditions of the detention site and the nature of the detention 
itself.234  By the 2008 election, the issue had attracted so much attention 
that closing Guantánamo became a core component of then-candidate 
Barack Obama’s platform.235  Seeking to fulfill his campaign promises, 
President Obama issued an executive order on his second full day in the 
White House directing the closure of the detention facilities at Guantánamo 
Bay within a year.236  Obama also ordered a review of the detainees’ cases, 
with an eye toward filtering out detainees who no longer posed a threat or 
would not eventually be prosecuted.237  Obama’s decision was praised by 
human rights groups but condemned by Republicans in Congress, who 
feared that the new policy could lead to the transfer of detainees to the 
United States.238 
Part II.A.1 examines the ways in which Congress enshrined its 
opposition to Guantánamo’s closure in defense spending bills throughout 
Obama’s first term.  Part II.A.2 looks specifically at the 2014 NDAA, 
which the administration allegedly violated by failing to notify Congress 
thirty days before transferring five Taliban detainees as part of the Bergdahl 
exchange. 
1.   The Increasingly Contentious Legislative Environment Surrounding 
Guantánamo Detainees:  2009–2013 
The program initially proceeded according to plan as various countries 
agreed to accept former Guantánamo detainees, and citizens of Afghanistan, 
Chad, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen were repatriated by 
their country of origin.239  However, likely in response to the federal trial of 
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one of the embassy bombers,240 Congress used the 2009 Supplemental 
Appropriations Act to prohibit the use of defense funds for the release or 
transfer of any Guantánamo detainees “into the continental United States, 
Alaska, Hawaii, or the District of Columbia.”241 
The Act further required the President to submit—both to Congress and 
to the governor of the proposed host state—a plan for relocation or transfer 
to an American prison, taking into account such factors as cost and risk to 
national security.242  The statute also placed limitations on the transfer of 
any detainee to his country of origin or any other foreign country, although 
the fifteen-day notification requirement for doing so was a significantly 
lower barrier than that applied to domestic transfers.243  The President did 
not raise any objections to these measures in his signing statement.244 
The effort to close Guantánamo lost significant momentum after an 
attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009, caused Obama to suspend 
the repatriation of scores of detainees to Yemen.245  The flood of transfers 
and releases from Guantánamo, which peaked at 122 in 2007,246 slowed to 
a trickle by 2010, when only twenty-four detainees left the compound 
permanently,247 and dried up completely in 2011, when just one detainee 
was transferred (and none after January).248  This trend likely reflected 
growing congressional opposition to such transfers.249 
a.   The 2010 and 2011 NDAAs 
The 2010 NDAA included the same consultation and notification 
requirements contained in the 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, but it 
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also lifted the repatriation ban.250  This decision was indicative of 
Congress’s underlying emphasis on barring transfers to the United States, 
which it considered an unnecessary security risk.251  The following year, in 
the 2011 NDAA, Congress responded to the Justice Department’s proposal 
to federally prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed, “the self-described 
mastermind of the Sept[ember] 11 attacks,”252 by specifically naming him 
as one of the detainees who may not be transferred to America.253  
Additionally, section 1032 of the 2011 NDAA prohibited the use of funds 
for the construction of detainee facilities within the United States, again as 
an attempt to forestall Obama’s announced plan to bring some of the 
detainees to U.S. territory.254 
Yet the most significant change to congressional policy that year came in 
section 1033, which established strict certification requirements for the 
transfer of detainees to foreign countries.255  Under this provision, the 
Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, would 
have to ensure that the proposed recipient of the detainee, whether or not it 
was his country of origin, could effectively control the detainee and prevent 
him from posing a threat to the United States.256  This certification was due 
no later than thirty days before the proposed transfer.257  The only 
exception applied to transfers made “to effectuate an order affecting the 
disposition of the individual that is issued by a court or competent tribunal 
of the United States having lawful jurisdiction,” which would only require 
“prompt[]” congressional notification.258 
President Obama formally expressed his displeasure with these 
constraints in the signing statement that accompanied the 2011 NDAA.259  
He first deplored section 1032, which refused funding for construction or 
modification of detention centers in the United States, as “a dangerous and 
unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority to determine 
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when and where to prosecute Guantánamo detainees.”260  With regard to 
section 1033, which laid out the certification requirements for transfer to 
foreign countries, Obama admonished Congress for “interfer[ing] with the 
authority of the executive branch to make important and consequential 
foreign policy and national security determinations regarding whether and 
under what circumstances” the President may transfer detainees.261  Obama 
then placed the transfers within the context of his broader power to conduct 
foreign affairs, arguing that the executive branch must retain “the ability to 
act swiftly and to have broad flexibility” in negotiating with other countries, 
a power that section 1033 severely restricted.262  Acknowledging the need 
to fund military operations in the midst of two wars, the President still 
signed the bill despite these objections, although he also vowed to dampen 
their impact while seeking their repeal.263 
b.   The 2012 NDAA 
The 2012 NDAA included all of these provisions in exact or slightly 
modified form, even after some of the concerns Congress was guarding 
against dissipated.264  In April 2011, the Department of Justice announced 
that it would no longer prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four of his 
coconspirators in federal district court, “reluctantly” handing the case back 
to DOD to be pursued via military commission instead.265  Attorney 
General Eric Holder cited congressional opposition, and specifically the 
“series of barriers” erected through the preceding NDAAs, as the primary 
reason for DOJ’s shift in strategy.266  Senator Mitch McConnell, the Senate 
minority leader at the time, welcomed the news, announcing on the floor 
that Congress had achieved its primary objective of isolating dangerous 
detainees from the United States and keeping them out of the federal court 
system, where he feared they would be afforded too many protections.267  
He did not mention the transfer of detainees abroad, either for repatriation 
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or supervision by a third country, which seemed to have remained at most 
an ancillary concern.268 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) voiced the White 
House’s disapproval of the 2012 NDAA much earlier in the legislative 
process, issuing a “Statement of Administration Policy” regarding House 
Resolution 1540 (the precursor to the NDAA) in May 2011.269  Reinforcing 
many of the arguments made in President Obama’s earlier signing 
statement, OMB concluded that the proposed restrictions on the transfer of 
detainees to foreign countries would “interfere[] with the authority of the 
Executive branch to make important foreign policy and national security 
determinations regarding whether and under what circumstances such 
transfers should occur.”270  OMB also objected to the new review system, 
arguing that it would unnecessarily disrupt the framework the President 
instituted with his 2009 executive order.271  In November, OMB issued a 
similar statement in response to Senate Resolution 1867, echoing the claims 
of interference with executive branch authority and cautioning that “the 
detention provisions in this bill micromanage the work of our experienced 
counterterrorism professionals, including our military commanders, 
intelligence professionals, seasoned counterterrorism prosecutors, or other 
operatives in the field.”272 
President Obama signed the 2012 NDAA into law on December 31, 
2011, using his signing statement to further explain several of his 
reservations.273  For the first time, President Obama also directly raised a 
separation of powers argument, writing that the legislature’s move 
amounted to a usurpation of his executive authority while also advising 
Congress that his administration would interpret the NDAA provisions to 
avoid such a constitutional conflict.274  The President’s claims, however, 
did not speak to the congressional use of funding restrictions to achieve its 
ends of detainee policy oversight.275  Meanwhile, four detainees left 
Guantánamo in 2011:  one was transferred to Algeria and three died in 
detention.276 
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c.   The 2013 NDAA 
The following year brought more of the same.  The House introduced 
several new reporting requirements, such as notification within five days 
when individuals were detained onboard naval vessels277 and notification 
no later than ten days before the transfer of detainees from a coalition 
facility in Parwan, Afghanistan, to either Afghan or foreign control.278  
OMB issued its response in May 2012, reminding Congress that the Obama 
Administration still opposed restrictions on the President’s discretion to 
transfer or release detainees from Guantánamo.279  Section 1041 (later 
ratified as section 1025), which restricted transfers from Parwan, 
particularly incensed the White House, which called it “an unprecedented, 
unwarranted, and misguided intrusion into the military’s detention 
operations” that could “micromanage the decisions of experienced military 
commanders and diplomats . . . [and] compromise the Executive’s ability to 
act swiftly and flexibly during a critical time for transition in 
Afghanistan.”280  This assessment seemed to be validated by reports that 
spring on the local, informal prisoner exchanges that regularly took place 
during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.281 
The Senate’s version of the bill, as well as the final form presented to the 
President, kept these new regulations mostly in place.282  So, once again, 
President Obama signed the 2013 NDAA but expressed serious concerns 
about some of its provisions.283  Section 1025 posed the most egregious 
constitutional violation, he posited, because it “could interfere with [his] 
ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about 
the appropriate disposition of detainees.”284  The new requirements also 
ignored the long tradition of “[d]ecisions regarding the disposition of 
detainees captured on foreign battlefields” being made by military 
commanders and national security professionals, not members of 
Congress.285  Finally, the President reiterated his objections to the 
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restrictions on transfers or releases from Guantánamo because they 
hindered his ability to conduct foreign affairs and act decisively as 
Commander in Chief.286  Four detainees were transferred from Guantánamo 
in 2012:  one was repatriated to his home country of Sudan, one was 
transferred to Canada, and two resettled in El Salvador after being released 
by a federal judge.287  The President seemed to have complied with the 
congressional notification requirements in each of these cases.288 
2.   The 2014 NDAA:  Congressional Limitations on Guantánamo Transfers 
and the Obama Administration’s Response 
The 2014 NDAA loosened some of the transfer restrictions enacted in 
2012 and 2013, most notably the prohibition on transfers to countries with 
even a single instance of recidivism among its hosted detainees.289  
Congress also enumerated several factors to be considered by the Secretary 
of Defense prior to determining the suitability of a detainee for transfer or 
release, which included the recommendations of the President’s review task 
force.290  Recognizing that these modifications were “an improvement over 
current law and . . . a welcome step toward closing” the Guantánamo 
detention facility, the President still objected to the notification requirement 
because of its potential to hinder negotiations with foreign countries 
regarding detainee transfers.291  Obama also questioned the constitutionality 
of section 1034, which denied funds for the transfer of any detainees to the 
United States, on the grounds that its interference with his executive 
discretion on where to prosecute alleged terrorists violated separation of 
powers principles.292  Just as in previous years, the President did not heed 
calls from his advisors to veto the bill,293 instead writing that the 
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Administration would implement sections 1034 and 1035 “in a manner that 
avoids the constitutional conflict.”294 
The 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act,295 passed shortly after the 
NDAA and including what the GAO refers to as the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, reinforced many of the NDAA’s transfer 
restrictions.296  Of note, section 8111 of the CAA granted the Pentagon 
permission to use its appropriated funds to transfer a Guantánamo detainee 
to a foreign country only if the Secretary of Defense complied with section 
1035 of the NDAA.297  Section 1035, in turn, required congressional 
notification no later than thirty days before the transfer, including “[a] 
detailed statement of the basis for the transfer or release[,] . . . [a]n 
explanation of why the transfer or release is in the national security interests 
of the United States[,] . . . [and a] description of any actions taken to 
mitigate the risks of reengagement by the individual to be transferred or 
released.”298 
These requirements, listed under the “Counterterrorism” subtitle of 
Section X in the NDAA, explicitly link congressional concerns about the 
closure of Guantánamo with the broader effort against al Qaeda and related 
groups.299  The primary nonpolitical motivation for keeping Guantánamo 
open appeared to have been fear of recidivism, with members of Congress 
citing various cases of detainees returning to the battlefield after being 
released.300  Although ongoing assessments by the Director of National 
Intelligence undermined many of these claims by showing that the 
recidivism rate had declined steeply since President Obama took office and 
instituted the review measures contained in Executive Order 13492,301 
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sensational cases still emerged.302  Either way, the link between the 
viability of Guantánamo and ongoing military funding remained specious:  
of the nine provisions in the Counterterrorism subtitle, not one mentioned 
the conduct of military operations, which were addressed in detail 
throughout the rest of the NDAA.303  The only mention of POWs came in 
section 581, under “Subtitle I—Other Matters,” which ordered an 
assessment of the economic efficiencies to be gained from shifting the Joint 
POW/MIA Command to the direct control of the Secretary of Defense.304 
In contrast, Sensitive Military Operations, the subtitle that immediately 
followed Counterterrorism, established a new congressional oversight 
mechanism but provided a very different reporting framework for missions 
similar in scale to the Bergdahl recovery.305  Defined as “a lethal operation 
or capture operation conducted by the armed forces,” a sensitive military 
operation required only post hoc notification to the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees.306  Furthermore, missions of this type 
conducted within “a theater of major hostilities” were entirely exempt from 
the reporting requirement.307  Unlike the thirty-day lead time required for 
the transfer of a Guantánamo detainee, DOD did not have to inform 
Congress of a sensitive military operation until after it occurred, and there 
was no specific deadline by which the notification must have been sent.308 
This effort toward executive accountability to the legislative branch was 
counterbalanced by the overall shift toward flexible funding in DOD budget 
apportionment over the same period.309  Of the $625.1 billion appropriated 
in the 2014 NDAA, for example, $80.7 billion went to overseas 
contingency operations (OCO), a supplemental pot of money originally 
used only for the Global War on Terror.310  Although the NDAA did not 
specifically define overseas contingency operations, DOD guidance 
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suggested that the money must have some type of hook to a region of active 
combat operations, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or “[g]eographic areas in 
which combat or direct combat support operations . . . occur.”311  Over the 
years, however, the link between OCO spending and actual wartime needs 
has become increasingly tenuous, with some critics arguing that the base 
budget/OCO distinction is merely a trick to avoid mandatory spending 
caps.312  In 2014, for example, Congress allotted $5 billion more in OCO 
funds than the Pentagon had requested, much of it only tangentially related 
to the war.313  Congress also scrutinizes less strictly OCO appropriations, 
presumably because the money is supposed to be supporting frontline 
operations.314 
Title IX of the 2014 CAA, Overseas Contingency Operations, allotted 
approximately $32.4 billion to the Army’s “operations and maintenance” 
fund, the account the Obama Administration used to pay the Qataris.315  
Section 9005 of this title granted $30 million to the Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program, which was designed to give military 
commanders in Afghanistan the ability to respond to “urgent, small-scale” 
crises within their areas of responsibility.316  In a nod to the discretion 
necessary on the battlefield, any expenditure below $5 million would not 
trigger congressional notification, and expenditures over that amount only 
required fifteen-day notice to the relevant committees.317  The Act also 
conditioned the use of OCO funds for aid to Pakistan on the satisfaction of 
certain prerequisites by that country, as certified by the Secretaries of State 
and Defense.318  Congress waived those restrictions as long as the 
Secretaries submitted a report explaining that it was in the “national 
security interest” of the United States to do so, but the CAA did not define a 
timeline for the submission of such a report.319 
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B.   The Exchange of Five Taliban Detainees 
for a Captured U.S. Soldier in May 2014 
Questions remain over the exact circumstances of then-Private First Class 
Bergdahl’s disappearance from his post in Paktika Province, Afghanistan, 
on June 30, 2009.320  His unit and others conducted various unsuccessful 
searches over the next several months, growing in scope and duration to no 
avail.321  The Taliban released two videos of Bergdahl during that time, 
demanding the release of a “limited number of prisoners” in exchange for 
his freedom.322  Contact between the U.S. government and the Taliban 
remained intermittent, with no formal talks for the next two years.323 
Yet the “Taliban Five,” as they have become known, were no strangers to 
Congress.324  Indeed, as early as January 2012 four of them had been 
identified by name in a House Resolution seeking to prohibit their release 
from Guantánamo until Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban leader, 
entered U.S. custody.325  This resolution came just days after the Obama 
Administration first briefed members of Congress on the proposal,326 as 
well as premature reports that the United States had exchanged Bergdahl for 
three of the Taliban commanders.327  A month later, the Wall Street Journal 
reported the “open secret” that Obama was considering releasing the five 
detainees as “a goodwill gesture” ahead of potential peace talks with the 
Taliban.328  As the newspaper presciently noted, “Congress can’t stop these 
transfers, but it can raise a fuss.”329 
The Obama Administration publicly confirmed the possibility of a 
Bergdahl-Taliban exchange for the first time in May 2012, releasing details 
of the proposed deal in response to reports that Bergdahl’s family had 
begun communicating directly with the Taliban.330  Many of the terms of 
this proposal, which were almost identical to those briefed to Congress in 
late 2011 and early 2012, ended up in the final agreement two years later.331  
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Negotiations remained intermittent over the next year and a half, stalling 
until a video proving that Bergdahl was still alive convinced the United 
States to relent to Taliban demands for the simultaneous release of all five 
detainees.332  As the White House acknowledged, this was the only instance 
of a U.S. servicemember being formally exchanged with the enemy during 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.333 
The process accelerated over the several weeks preceding the exchange, 
as an agreement began to seem more plausible.334  Neither side publicized 
the progress though, fearing that a leak could undermine the talks, nor did 
they inform the Afghan government ahead of time, likely for the same 
reason.335  Despite this, the deal did not come as a surprise in Afghanistan 
once it was announced.336  On May 31, 2014, the day of the transfer, the 
Secretary of Defense informed the required members of Congress of the 
exchange via letter.337  Months later, DOD had not yet released details 
about how Bergdahl became separated from his unit in the first place, nor 
where and under what conditions he was held captive.338 
C.   The Controversy Surrounding the President’s Ability 
to Conduct the Exchange 
The immediate euphoria surrounding Bergdahl’s release quickly faded to 
ambivalence over the price paid for his freedom and the means used to 
secure it.339  The congressional response focused on the White House’s 
failure to notify leaders of the transfer of the Taliban Five from 
Guantánamo to Qatar, while the President emphasized the unique 
circumstances surrounding Bergdahl’s recovery. 
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1.   Congress Objects to Not Being Properly Notified 
and the GAO Declares the Exchange Illegal 
Representative Mike Rogers, chair of the House Intelligence Committee, 
raised concerns that “this decision will threaten the lives of American 
soldiers for years to come,” presumably because the exchange of five 
Taliban for one American seemed to reward the enemy for capturing U.S. 
personnel.340  Representative Howard McKeon, chair of the House Armed 
Services Committee, and Senator James M. Inhofe, the senior minority 
member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, echoed this concern 
before also objecting to the exchange on constitutional grounds:  “Our joy 
at Sergeant Bergdahl’s release is tempered by the fact that President Obama 
chose to ignore the law, not to mention sound policy, to achieve it.”341 
Two weeks after the announcement of the exchange, Senate leaders 
requested that the GAO provide its opinion on whether DOD had violated 
the notification requirement and spending restrictions contained in the 2014 
CAA.342  Sidestepping the constitutional issues, the GAO concluded that 
DOD had, in fact, violated section 8111 by not notifying the appropriate 
congressional committees at least thirty days prior to the exchange.343  The 
use of appropriated funds for a non-appropriated purpose, the GAO found, 
also violated the Antideficiency Act because DOD “incurr[ed] obligations 
exceeding an amount available in an appropriation.”344  The House 
immediately voted to condemn the Obama Administration for failing to 
comply with its statutory notification requirements.345 
2.   The Obama Administration Argues That the Exchange 
Was a Valid Exercise of the President’s Power As Commander in Chief 
Administration officials countered that delaying the exchange to comply 
with the notification requirements “would have left Bergdahl unacceptably 
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vulnerable.”346  This fear stemmed primarily from concerns over 
Bergdahl’s health, although it was not clear how his condition had changed 
since the last round of negotiations fell through.347  In testimony to the 
House Armed Services Committee shortly after announcing the exchange, 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel referred to the need for the executive 
branch to act quickly to ensure Bergdahl’s safety.348  Confusion also exists 
over whether the Taliban had threatened to kill Bergdahl if the United 
States did not accede to its terms.349  Supporters of the decision also 
questioned the logic that the deal would encourage future hostage-taking, 
arguing that the deal was odious but necessary and comported with a long 
tradition of “negotiat[ing] with terrorists.”350 
In addition to the excuse of exigent circumstances, the White House soon 
offered two other more refined legal arguments:  (1) the transfer was lawful 
regardless of notification because the Secretary of Defense complied with 
the certification requirement in section 1035(b), and (2) providing notice 
would have prevented the President from performing his functions as 
Commander in Chief, namely the safeguarding of American 
servicemembers.351  Once the GAO rejected these approaches, the White 
House responded by reiterating its position that it forewent the notification 
requirement because it “had a fleeting opportunity to protect the life of a 
U.S. servicemember held captive and in danger for almost five years.”352 
The White House also apologized to Senator Dianne Feinstein, the chair 
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, for committing “an oversight” by not 
informing her of the exchange before it happened.353  Despite efforts by the 
House to prohibit all transfers or releases from Guantánamo for at least the 
next year,354 seventeen detainees have left Guantánamo since the Taliban 
Five were transferred to Qatar,355 including four more Taliban who returned 
directly to Afghanistan.356  As it stands, neither Congress nor the President 
is conceding any authority, and the courts seem unlikely to step in.357 
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III.   THE PRESIDENT POSSESSED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO 
EXCHANGE TALIBAN DETAINEES FOR A CAPTURED U.S. SOLDIER 
DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON GUANTÁNAMO TRANSFERS 
Debates over the appropriate balance of legislative and executive powers 
have raged since colonial times, and the tension between the political 
branches is one of the defining features of American democracy.  Within 
this broader discussion, evaluation of the competing congressional and 
presidential claims over defense policy has been a particularly thorny area.  
The controversy over the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange is therefore a mostly 
political dispute that also contains deep constitutional implications.  The 
non-state nature of the enemy in the Global War on Terror also makes this 
case unique, with individual actors potentially having an outsized effect on 
the “battlefield,” minimal accountability for detainees after they have been 
released, and no definitive resolution to the war in sight.  Under these 
circumstances, Congress arguably should have a greater role in setting 
military objectives due to the inherent blurring of tactics and policy. 
Regardless, congressional attempts to retroactively dictate prisoner 
recovery policy through the use of spending restrictions is a radical 
departure from centuries of historical and judicial precedent.  The exchange 
of detainees and transfer of funds fell solely within President Obama’s 
authority as Commander in Chief, and congressional attempts to limit those 
powers by financially handcuffing the President’s ability to repatriate an 
American servicemember were unconstitutional.  Part III.A demonstrates 
how this conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
scope of executive authority.  Part III.B places the Bergdahl-Taliban 
exchange within the longstanding tradition of presidential control over 
prisoner recovery policy and concludes that the use of appropriations riders 
and notification requirements regarding Guantánamo transfers were cases of 
legislative overreach. 
A.   The Exchange Complied with Judicial Precedent 
Although not “every case or controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance,”358 courts traditionally have been reluctant 
to consider cases involving an area they regard as primarily the domain of 
the political branches.359  The same principle applies to cases that involve 
“the Constitution’s government-structuring provisions.”360  With that said, a 
constitutional analysis remains relevant because “the Constitution [still] can 
influence policy even when it is not enforced by the courts.”361  This part 
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will illustrate how key Supreme Court decisions enhance the credibility of 
the White House’s arguments in favor of the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange. 
1.   Operating Within Youngstown’s Zone of Twilight 
At first glance, the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange seems to fall into the third 
Youngstown category because President Obama directly contravened the 
appropriations rider’s notification and funding requirements.362  This 
admittedly would be the case if the President’s only objective in 
transferring the Taliban Five were to hasten the closure of the Guantánamo 
detention facility, a process Congress had explicitly sought to stop.  Yet this 
analysis falls short because it depends on a view of the exchange as the 
mere transfer or release of Guantánamo detainees, rather than what it 
actually was:  an international agreement brokered to secure the safe 
homecoming of a U.S. soldier.  The Bergdahl-Taliban controversy 
implicates the two competing priorities of presidential control over U.S. 
prisoner policy and congressional control over defense spending.  Any 
analysis, including the GAO’s, that approaches the issue from only one of 
these perspectives is incomplete.  These dueling claims instead shift the 
conflict into the middle Youngstown category because both branches have 
legitimate claims to authority but are unable to share it.363 
As the Court acknowledged, analysis within this category is highly 
contextual.364  In Youngstown, for example, the Court struck down 
President Truman’s seizure of steel mills because the seizure constituted a 
taking of private property by the federal government, an action that 
Congress had thoroughly considered and rejected.365  Here, however, 
Congress did not consider the possible impact its Guantánamo restrictions 
could have on negotiations to repatriate U.S. captives, let alone evaluate and 
implement an overarching strategy for their recovery.366 
Instead, Congress inadvertently undermined the President’s ability to 
negotiate for the release of an American POW, a power that falls solely 
under the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.367  The “gloss” on 
executive power provided by a history of congressional acquiescence in 
matters of repatriation overcame the unrelated statutory restriction on 
Guantánamo transfers and permitted the President to recover Bergdahl, 
even if he had to exchange Taliban detainees to do so.368  As the sun 
continues to set on the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, the zone of 
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twilight afforded the President will naturally shadow more areas.369  His 
authority always has included the ability to recover a captured U.S. 
servicemember.370 
2.   Dames & Moore’s Deference to Intent 
The Court affirmed this approach in Dames & Moore, when it recognized 
the need for clear congressional intent to override an executive agreement 
negotiated and entered into as the resolution to a major foreign policy 
conflict.371  In that case, the Court conducted its analysis in light of the 
presence of enabling legislation and the absence of any prohibitive 
statutes.372  In the current controversy, Congress granted President Obama 
control over prisoner recovery efforts first by acquiescing to presidential 
control of that domain and second by not passing any legislation asserting 
congressional claims over that power.373 
The Court also rejected Dames & Moore’s allegation that the executive 
order was a presidential circumscription of the courts’ powers, referring to 
clear contextual evidence that the intent of the executive order was to 
terminate an international dispute and not to seize control of the domestic 
judiciary.374  Congress has raised similar concerns that President Obama 
usurped the spending power by ignoring the NDAA rider regarding 
notification and funds appropriation.375  Once again, however, a court 
would look to the legislative history of the NDAA rider.376  The purpose of 
the rider was to prevent the closure of Guantánamo while keeping detainees 
out of domestic detention facilities, not to prolong the captivity of a 
captured U.S. servicemember.377  The NDAA rider, by setting conditions 
on the transfer of detainees from Guantánamo, did not somehow divest the 
President of his authority to negotiate for the release of U.S. prisoners of 
war. 
3.   Executive Discretion Under Curtiss-Wright 
Finally, under Curtiss-Wright, the President retains a fair amount of 
discretion as the sole organ of American diplomacy.378  As the Court noted, 
this is “especially . . . true in time of war.”379  The closure of Guantánamo 
has both foreign and domestic implications, but the repatriation of an 
American POW and the negotiations with the other state and non-state 
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actors involved in that process are purely foreign.380  Furthermore, while it 
can be seen as a precursor to the conclusion of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the exchange was not part of a broader pact with the Taliban or 
the government of Afghanistan.381  Rather, it more closely resembled an 
executive agreement between President Obama and the Qatari emir, who 
sealed the deal by personally shaking hands with each other.382  The 
Supreme Court has never declared an executive agreement unconstitutional 
on the grounds that it usurps Congress’s authority to make treaties, a trend 
that, in turn, encourages the President to use executive agreements to 
achieve policy goals of narrow scope or limited duration.383  For these 
reasons, the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange should be subject to much less 
congressional oversight than a domestic issue, such as the transfer of 
Guantánamo detainees to the United States, or a foreign issue relating to a 
treaty. 
B.   The Exchange Complied with Historical Precedent 
The Bergdahl-Taliban exchange seems unremarkable when it is placed in 
the historical context of wartime U.S. prisoner recovery policy.  Once 
again, referring to the Bergdahl-Taliban controversy as a “release” or 
“transfer” of Guantánamo detainees mischaracterizes both its means and its 
end.  The U.S. government exchanged enemy combatants, regardless of 
their status under the Geneva Conventions, for a captured U.S. 
servicemember.  This section demonstrates that while the exchange is 
merely the latest instance of executive control over the recovery of a 
captured U.S. servicemember, the 2014 NDAA’s restrictions on 
Guantánamo transfers are aberrational attempts at curtailing presidential 
discretion. 
1.   U.S. Prisoner Recovery Policy Always Has Permitted 
Exchanging Captured Combatants with the Enemy 
The President, acting as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, has 
customarily exercised control over efforts to repatriate captured U.S. 
servicemembers because that decision often depends on an alignment of 
strategic and tactical considerations that cannot occur via legislative 
oversight.384  Throughout American history, the President, in consultation 
with his staff, has set an overarching recovery policy and then delegated its 
execution to his military commanders in the field.385  This approach is 
based on an understanding that circumstances change rapidly during war 
and that bureaucratic micromanagement or overreach will often hinder 
recovery efforts.386 
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George Washington, acting as Commander in Chief of the Continental 
Army, established local prisoner exchanges during the Revolutionary 
War.387  President Lincoln did the same during the Civil War, with the 
added wrinkle that the troops being exchanged for Union soldiers were 
technically non-state actors.388  At the height of World War II, the United 
States transferred hundreds of thousands of enemy captives to domestic 
bases.389  Reciprocal releases during the Vietnam War led to large numbers 
of Northern Vietnamese and Viet Cong captives leaving U.S. control 
without any guarantee that U.S. troops would be freed.390 
Policy aspects aside, these practices demonstrate an unbroken chain of 
transfers of enemy captives to either enemy or third-party control in direct 
or indirect exchange for the recovery of U.S. prisoners.391  In each case, the 
President saw prisoner exchanges as a tool, giving him leverage to more 
effectively wage war.392  The exchange of the Taliban Five, a group of non-
state actors transferred to a country not formally allied with either side of 
the conflict, for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. soldier in Taliban captivity 
for five years, neatly complies with each of these precedents.  Conversely, 
the notification requirements and spending restrictions included in the 
2010–2014 NDAAs constituted an unprecedented effort by Congress to 
dictate enemy detainee policy.393 
Some critics have referred to the prisoner exchange as an unprecedented 
instance of the U.S. government negotiating with terrorists and to the one 
million dollars paid to the Qataris as a ransom.394  As demonstrated above, 
the United States, from the President down to low-level military 
commanders, has repeatedly engaged in discussions with opposing forces 
over the recovery of its personnel during both conventional and 
unconventional conflicts.395  Prisoner exchanges conducted during the 
Revolutionary and Civil Wars were far more widespread and far less 
controversial than the one-time deal conducted in Afghanistan.396  In 
Vietnam, the U.S. military oversaw a system of releases of non-state 
actors—the Viet Cong—under far murkier conditions than those 
surrounding the exchange with the stateless Taliban.397  Furthermore, 
unlike the ransoms paid to the Barbary States in the nineteenth century, the 
United States paid Qatar, not the Taliban, to accept the detainees.398  Of 
note, the Taliban gained no financial or propaganda benefit from the 
 
 387. See supra Part I.C.3.a. 
 388. See supra Part I.C.3.b. 
 389. See supra Part I.C.3.c. 
 390. See supra Part I.C.3.d. 
 391. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 392. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 393. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 394. See supra Part II.C. 
 395. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 396. Compare supra Part I.C.3.a–b, with supra Part II.B–C. 
 397. Compare supra Part I.C.3.d, with supra Part II.B–C. 
 398. Compare supra note 71 and accompanying text, with supra Part II.B–C. 
2015] PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PRISONER EXCHANGES 2883 
transfer of one million dollars to the Qataris.399  The exchange, while 
imperfect, might have been President Obama’s “least worst” option.400 
2.  Notification Requirements and Spending Restrictions Had Never Before 
Impeded the Recovery of a Captured U.S. Servicemember 
The 2014 NDAA’s notification requirements, although rooted in the 
tradition of the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Oversight Act, 
are much more onerous than either of those pieces of legislation and 
overstep the bounds of appropriate congressional oversight.  The 
notification requirements in the War Powers Resolution are purely 
retroactive, applying only after the introduction of U.S. forces to 
hostilities.401  Likewise, under the Intelligence Oversight Act, the President 
need only inform Congress “in a timely fashion” after the execution of an 
especially sensitive covert action.402  The 2014 CAA itself contains looser 
reporting restrictions for the assignment of billions of dollars in aid to 
Pakistan, providing no deadline for congressional notification if, after 
determining that it is in the nation’s interests to do so, the Departments of 
Defense and State waive congressionally enumerated restrictions.403 
Ex post congressional notification is the norm in cases as sensitive as the 
return of the last U.S. POW in the War on Terror, and the stringency of the 
preemptive notification requirements is unique to Guantánamo transfers.404  
Members of Congress knew about the exchange immediately before or 
immediately after it happened, and, either way, the exchange did not come 
as a surprise.405  As several of the deal’s most outspoken critics admit, 
relevant congressional leaders knew about the proposal as early as 2011.406  
Of note, none of the spending bills during this period implied that Congress 
could reject a proposed detainee transfer to a foreign country, nor did any of 
them provide a means for redress if the President did not comply.407  
Notification did not invite consultation, let alone provide an opportunity for 
denial.  The President should have tried to comply with the statutory 
requirements to the maximum extent practicable, but, ultimately, Congress 
could not have disapproved of the exchange and intervened to stop it.408  
This reality is reflected in the other bedrocks of congressional oversight but 
curiously absent from the Guantánamo riders.409 
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Shifting the analytical framework from a detainee release to a prisoner 
exchange also alleviates the alleged violation of the Antideficiency Act 
because prisoner exchanges traditionally fall within the scope of the 
discretion granted to military commanders.410  As evidenced in the 2014 
CAA’s funding for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and 
the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, Congress 
acknowledged that oversight of wartime funding is necessarily looser than 
it would be under different circumstances.411  Congress drew the line at $5 
million in these provisions, concluding that anything below that amount 
was not worthy of its consideration and recognizing the need to trust the 
discretion of local commanders in combat environments.412  The one 
million dollars given to the Qataris fell well below the fiscal threshold of 
that discretion set by Congress in the 2014 NDAA and CAA.413  Congress 
allotted the military more than enough money to secure Bergdahl’s 
repatriation.  Tying the Army’s OCO funding for combat operations to the 
release of Guantánamo detainees, though, depended on a false conception 
of the Taliban as something other than a wartime enemy.414 
3.   Appropriations Riders Are a Means of Shaping Policy, 
Not Dictating Tactical Decisions 
The NDAA riders prohibiting the transfer or release of Guantánamo 
detainees are fundamentally different from earlier congressional attempts to 
influence defense policy via its power of the purse because they directly 
interfered with the President’s ability to carry out a solely executive 
function.415  Unlike the prohibition on military aid to the Contras, the 
Bergdahl-Taliban exchange did not constitute a major policy decision 
subject to congressional deliberation.416  It was a tactical decision properly 
made by the Commander in Chief. 
Additionally, the Boland Amendments represented a compromise 
between the branches in an area of “shared congressional-executive 
authority,” specifically military aid and covert operations.417  The 
legislation was relatively narrow in scope, and President Reagan never 
voiced any opposition to it.418  Consensus seemed to exist at the time that 
the United States should not become involved in Nicaragua.419  On the 
contrary, short of vetoing the legislation, President Obama has opposed the 
Guantánamo transfer riders at every step of the legislative process, and 
Congress has never sought to tie the transfer restrictions to the recovery of 
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captured U.S. military personnel.420  There have been no substantive policy 
agreements regarding the transfer of detainees from Guantánamo, and the 
NDAA rider stymied a major facet of President Obama’s platform while 
also restricting his ability to conduct a war.421  This trend does not represent 
a consensus on the way forward in Afghanistan, nor on the future of 
prisoner recovery policy. 
CONCLUSION 
President Obama’s recent exchange of five Taliban detainees for a 
captured U.S. soldier stirred debate among policy and legal scholars alike.  
Congress immediately raised concerns over the constitutionality of the 
exchange, arguing that the White House failed to comply with statutory 
notification requirements contained in the most recent defense-spending 
bill.  Congress also objected to the Pentagon’s use of appropriated funds to 
effect the deal.  Recognizing these concerns, the President and Secretary of 
Defense apologized for the lack of notice but defended their actions as 
permissible under the executive’s authority as Commander in Chief of the 
armed forces.  At Congress’s request, the GAO conducted an investigation 
and concluded that the President had, in fact, violated the appropriations 
riders contained in the 2014 NDAA.  The GAO, however, did not address 
the underlying conflict between congressional control of defense funding 
and presidential control of prisoner recovery policy. 
Legal analysis of this conflict begins with the tripartite framework for 
evaluation of executive action expressed in Youngstown, which is in turn 
highly contextual.  Despite congressional oversight of broader strategic 
objectives via its power of the purse, decisions over how to repatriate 
captured U.S. servicemembers always have been the President’s 
prerogative.  Furthermore, Congress attached the riders to the 2014 NDAA 
as a means of obstructing the closure of the Guantánamo detention facility, 
not in an effort to suddenly start overseeing prisoner recovery policy.  
Finally, the notification requirements and spending restrictions relating to 
the transfer of Guantánamo detainees were much more cumbersome than 
historical and contemporary precedents for operations of similar scale to the 
recovery of Sergeant Bergdahl.  As such, the riders unconstitutionally 
impeded the President’s ability to recover a captured servicemember, an 
area over which he has exercised sole control throughout U.S. history. 
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